The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a joint resolution adopted by the United States Congress on August 10, 1964 after a military incident between the United States and North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin bordering the coast of Vietnam. The military incident was an attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American destroyer on August 2, 1964 and two days later there was reportedly a second attack on the American destroyer. These two attacks by the North Vietnamese resulted in the resolution of the Gulf of Tonkin. The resolution authorizes the president "to take all necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to assist any member state or signatory to the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in the defense of its freedom”[1] (HJ RES 1145), which led the United States to become more directly involved in the Vietnam War. Say no to plagiarism. Get a Custom Essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”?Get the original essay President Lyndon B. Johnson used the grant of vague and ill-defined authority to dramatically increase the U.S. military presence in Vietnam with the introduction of combat troops. Many consider this to be a pivotal event in U.S. Congressional history, as it was the turning point that allowed Johnson to wage an undeclared war without direct congressional sanction. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was adopted following the second attack on August 4, 1964, which was later proven not to have occurred. This research paper will analyze the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by examining its origins and explaining its implementation. The article will place particular emphasis on analyzing the argument that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was misused by the Johnson administrations and on the constitutional and ethical dimensions of this policy based on false pretenses. Origin of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: The origin of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution dates back to a highly classified secret program called Operation 34A. This program was designed for the United States to clandestinely support South Vietnamese special forces operations. The main objective of these operations was for South Vietnamese special forces units to sabotage North Vietnamese coastal transportation facilities through raids. “The program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence on commando targets, northern coastal defenses and associated surveillance systems. »[2] (Schuster) Operation 34 A was a major cause of the crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August 2, 1964, the United States Navy destroyer USS Maddox was patrolling the waters near the coast of North Vietnam to conduct an intelligence gathering operation under the authority of Operation 34A. The USS Maddox was responsible for an intelligence gathering operation codenamed "Desoto Patrol" in which a "highly classified team aboard the USS Maddox transmitted sensitive North Vietnamese communications to the National Security Agency headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland. »[3] (Pusey p. 72) While executing the Desoto patrol, the USS Maddox detected that it was being pursued by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats. “As the North Vietnamese patrol boats continued their pursuit of the American destroyer, the USS Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they got within ten thousand yards.” (Schuster p. 30) The North Vietnamese patrol boats and USS Maddox exchanged fire, but neither ship inflicted significant damage. When the USS Maddox reported to Washington that the destroyerhad been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats, President Johnson met with his top advisors to consider a response. The president and his top advisers agreed that it was possible that a local North Vietnamese commander, rather than a high-ranking official, had ordered the attack on the USS Maddox, so they decided not to retaliate. Instead of retaliation, President Johnson ordered Desoto patrols to continue and added another destroyer, Turner Joy, to escort the USS Maddox. Two days later, USS Maddox again patrolled the coast of North Vietnam on the "Desoto Patrols", but she was accompanied by another destroyer, Turner Joy, due to the earlier attack on the USS Maddox. During the patrol, USS Maddox received signals that the destroyer was again under attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats. Due to signals of aggression, the USS Maddox reported to Washington that it was again under fire from the North Vietnamese. When the reports were received in Washington, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara urged the president to respond to the attack. And hours later, President Johnson launched airstrikes on North Vietnamese bases in retaliation for the attack. The first airstrikes to hit North Vietnam targeted four North Vietnamese patrol boat bases, as well as an oil storage depot located in the town of Vinh. Implementation of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: After President Johnson ordered airstrikes to be launched on North Vietnamese military bases in retaliation for the alleged attack on August 4, 1964, President Johnson contacted Congress to ask him to increase the military presence of the United States. in Vietnam. On August 6, 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified at a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the events of August 4 in the Gulf of Tonkin. McNamara pointed out that "the immediate occasion for this resolution is the course of North Vietnamese attacks on our warships..." The session turned into a discussion for a resolution to increase the United States presence in Vietnam , because they believed the USS Maddox had been attacked without provocation. After Robert McNamara's testimony, Congress had a debate on whether to adopt the resolution. It was decided that the United States would increase its presence in Vietnam. Congress therefore adopted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 10, 1964. The joint resolution authorized the president "to take all necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to assist any member state or protocol of the Collective Defense Treaty of Southeast Asia asking for help to defend their freedom”[5]. Congress understood that the resolution would give great authority to the President, but the Senate and House of Representatives passed it by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and unanimously in the House, 416 to 0. Having the power to To exert more military power in Vietnam, the United States quickly launched Operation Rolling Thunder, a large-scale bombing campaign of North Vietnamese targets. Rolling Thunder's objective was to carry out bombing raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a network of trails through dense jungle that connected North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was used by the Viet Cong for smuggling supplies and secret movement of troops. The President's goal for Operation Rolling Thunder was to cut off the movement of manpower and supplies from North Vietnam, which would result in boosting the morale of the South Vietnamese government. Not only did the presidentauthorized increased air power, but President Johnson also increased the number of "troops on the ground" in the region. Before the resolution was passed, there were approximately sixteen thousand American troops in South Vietnam. The role of American troops was to act as combat military advisors, training the South Vietnamese to fight the North Vietnamese and guerrilla forces in the campaign known as the Viet Cong. The goal of the training was to strengthen the new South Vietnamese government. However, even with the training of South Vietnamese troops, the United States supported "nation building" programs, South Vietnam continued to suffer from a weak government and continued losses in the face. to the North Vietnamese army. When the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed, the number of American troops in South Vietnam increased significantly. In 1965, there were more than one hundred and fifty thousand American troops in Vietnam. Many of these soldiers were wounded or killed and, by the time Johnson left office in 1969; “More than thirty thousand American soldiers died as well as hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese” (Pfiffner p. 13). [6] The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution created a large-scale military conflict in Vietnam that became increasingly unpopular among Americans. The ethical dimensions of the resolution: Many ethical objections have been raised regarding the adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. After the second attack on the USS Maddox and the subsequent response to retaliatory airstrikes ordered by President Johnson, the crew of the USS Maddox reported reviewing radar contacts and other information and determining that the second report attack by the North Vietnamese might have been doubtful. . “Subsequent SIGINT reports and erroneous analyzes that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. After-action reports from Gulf participants arrived in Washington several hours after the second incident was reported.” (Schuster) Although reports of false impressions were reported in Washington, the Johnson administration still went to Congress to respond to the attacks. During McNamara's testimony, the committees were unaware of the covert operations of Operation 34A and that the second attack probably did not occur. President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara knew that the second attack on the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin was most likely a flawed analysis. Yet when the two men addressed Congress, they acted as if the second attack had undoubtedly occurred. It can be argued that the President and Secretary of Defense lied to the American people and members of Congress about the events of August 4 in order to escalate the war in Vietnam. President Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam almost certainly had more to do with domestic U.S. politics rather than support from "any member state or protocol of the South Asia Collective Defense Treaty -Is asking for help in defending his freedom.”(HJ RES 1145) President Johnson had taken office after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, meaning Johnson served as president for the remainder of which would have was Kennedy's first term, a little less than a year before his re-election. In order to consolidate his full presidential term, Johnson rode on Kennedy's popularity and won the Democratic nomination. However, in the 1964 election, Johnson then found himself engaged in a bitter presidential race with Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater.One of Goldwater's main criticisms of Johnson was that he was soft on communism. “Repeatedly, he criticized the Johnson administration for its “indecision” and “failure to take a stronger military stance” on the Vietnam issue. (Cherwitz p. 34)[7] The driving force behind the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the effort to prove that President Johnson was not soft on communism. He used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to secure his presidential victory, knowing that Congress would not oppose military action against the North Vietnamese, especially at election time. Johnson's political deception has led the American people into an unwinnable war. Not only did the Johnson administration lie about the justification for escalating military action in Vietnam; the administration has exceeded the objective of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The ethical issues of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution involve the deception of the American people, but also the abuse of the power granted by the resolution. As previously noted, Congress understood that the resolution would give great authority to the president when Congress overwhelmingly approved the resolution. Congress was led to believe that the United States was under attack from North Vietnam and the powers granted to the president were being used in an emergency. There is no doubt that Congress did not intend to authorize the President to increase U.S. forces in Vietnam without thorough consultation. Initiating a full-scale military conflict that could easily have escalated into conflict with China or the Soviet Union was an outrage to Congress and the majority of the American people. Although the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was dissolved in 1969, just before the end of Johnson's term, the legacy of this resolution is still felt today. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution set the standard for executive power to overstep its bounds by misusing the war power granted by Congress. A modern example of the legacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AuMF) passed by Congress after the 2001 terrorist attack. Like the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the AuMF against terrorism was intended to be a temporary measure. grant of authority which allowed the president to engage in military action against the perpetrators of the attack. “However, the executive branch has used its authority for a decade, for an unlimited transfer of war authority against any group a president might deem dangerous. “[8] (Shoon p. 195) The cause of this ethical dilemma lies in the ambiguous language of the Constitution. Although the United States Congress has the power to declare war, the president is commander in chief, and presidents can go to war without the popular consent of Congress. Conclusion: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a joint resolution passed by the United States Congress after a military incident between the United States and North Vietnam. The purpose of the resolution was to take all necessary measures to assist South Vietnam in the war against North Vietnam and its Viet Cong allies. With the power to exert more military power in Vietnam, the United States quickly launched Operation Rolling Thunder, a large-scale bombing campaign of North Vietnamese targets. The number of American troops in South Vietnam increased significantly. At the height of the Vietnam War, there were more than half a million American troops in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin's ethical problems stem from the fact that the military incident was deemed questionable. There. 195