The United States Armed Forces were able to accomplish their mission during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. However, numerous deficiencies were noted in the conduct of the first joint operation since Viet Nam. This document will assess command and control during the operation using the attributes of intent, mutual trust and understanding of the commander. It will also assess joint intelligence, protection and fire functions. The commander's intent establishes a clear and concise expression of the operation and desired end state. This intention links understanding, mission, and direction to subordinate elements. Although the invasion of Grenada was successful, there were problems with the commander's intent. Given that the contingency operation had a very short planning timeline, it appears that the elements of the commander's intent were unclear. During the planning process, Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was unable to come up with an appropriate concept for the joint operation. Stewart posited that the command was neither trained nor staffed to mount this type of operation since the command's primary objective was to reinforce Europe after a Soviet attack. There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, Commander LANTCOM, made two command and control errors. He did not designate one of his subordinate commanders to act as director general of the ground forces, regardless of service, and he did not choose the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps as head of the armed forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and Army was minimal. The absence of a designated commander for the ground forces and the omission of the XVIII Airborne Corps muddled the commander's intentions. The services would have been...... middle of paper......AQ&usg=AFQjCNFIz4HQNnSs6HZIQunxtZDCoxiIRw (accessed December 24, 2013), p. 5. Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, (Washington, DC: US ​​Army Center of Military History, 2008), 32. Ibid, 33-34. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: US ​​Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), V-17.Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 34-35.Ibid, 34. Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0) United States, August 11, 2011), III-1.Ibid, III-20.Ibid, III -21.Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 32.Ibid, 15.Joint Operations, III-29-30.Ibid, III-32. Joint Operations, III-22.Ibid, III-24.Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 22.Ibid., 24.