If the mobile node leaves its home network, it starts searching for a new router called an access router to provide service from the visited network. With the help of AR, the mobile node will maintain connectivity with its original agent. But if the mobile node joins a new network, it is topologically not possible to keep the address assigned by the home network. So, a new address called Care of Address will be assigned by the AR and then the mobile node will have to send an update to its original agent regarding its new Care of Address. The process of updating the new care address to the respective original agent or corresponding node is called binding update (BU). This process is implemented again if the mobile node performs a handover. The duty of mobile nodes is to always update the new binding with the original agent; it guarantees the integrity of messages between these nodes and reassures the home agent regarding the legitimate mobile node. The Binding Acknowledgment (BA) message will be a response from the original agent for the update. An attacker can claim spoofed information that a particular legitimate mobile node is in a different location than where it actually is. If the home agent believes this information and works based on it, then the affected mobile node may not receive traffic at all. A malicious mobile node can use the home address of a legitimate victim node in a spoofed binding update sent to a corresponding node. These types of attacks generate threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of mobile nodes. An attacker can browse the contents of a packet destined for another node by redirecting traffic to it. This leads to a middleman attack between the mobile node and the corresponding node. An attacker can also send a fake link middle of paper...... such scenarios. Using Return Routability provides good support for MIPv6 without any security issues. This procedure checks the message exchange between the originating agent and the mobile node's care-of address to ensure that both nodes are reachable. Binding update messages are exchanged cryptographically. When a symmetric attack is used, the response is always sent to the node where the request originated, which avoids the reflection attack. The corresponding node needs to wait for the authorized binding update from the mobile node. Encapsulation (tunneling) is also carried out via encryption between the home agent and the mobile node with IPSec ESP. The irrelevant exchange through the tunnel avoids the possibility for attackers to verify the irrelevant message, which also helps prevent the attack on the visited network. Works cited NEMO, Security, Threats, Attacks