In “The Epistemic Meaning of Disagreement”, Thomas Kelly gives two answers to the question “How should awareness of disagreement, with those you consider your epistemic equal, be it, affect the rational confidence you have in your beliefs? Kelly discusses two possible answers to the question. The first is Richard Foley's first-person perspective argument. Adam Elga calls the second vision that of good reasons (Elga, 2007, p. 485). Kelly pursues this last point and goes no further than agreeing with Foley that we should only view these conflicts with a first-person perspective. I will show that Kelly's answer to the question of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is not convincing. In my explanation of Kelly's argument, I will show that it is contradictory for him to assert the first person view and the good reasons view. I will then examine the third-person perspective and show that it is more compatible with the good reasons view. I will, however, offer an objection in the form of a question. More to the point, why should the difference between first person and third person change the way I think skeptically? Would this view only be attractive from a third person perspective? The third person perspective, the good reasons view as Kelly explains, plus what I will call the external validation of a belief makes for a more compelling argument. Kelly defines epistemic peers as two people who have equal familiarity with the evidence and questions surrounding an argument. (Kelly, 2005, page 10). Epistemic peers must also be equal with respect to epistemic virtues such as intelligence (Kelly, 2005, p. 10). Kelly suggests that there is no meaning for someone to simply disagree with you which would result in you losing...... middle of paper ...... here an obvious asymmetry as there n It's not possible for a third party to agree with both. my conclusion and Sam's. Therefore, affirming the good reasons view, as it relates to a third person's perspective, and having your belief validated by that same third party makes a more compelling argument to keep confidence in one's beliefs in the event of disagreement. (1) Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Meaning of Disagreement.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Ed. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pg.1 – 36.(2) Rattan, Gurpreet (2014) “Disagreement and the First Person Perspective” Analytical Philosophy. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. p. 1 – 23.(3) Adam, Elga (2007) “Reflection and Disagreement” Princeton University Copyright the Authors Journal compilation, Blackwell Publishing, Inc. Pg. 478 – 502.